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Abstract 
In February 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a new Directive on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes. This proposal replaces an earlier draft of 
2007 for a Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes. The new 
proposal does not seem to allay the earlier concerns of important stakeholders with regard to the 
2007 proposal. Its content contradicts not only important principles of data protection as 
described by the Commission in November 2010, but also the principle of proportionality 
underlying EU law. This paper examines the extended purpose and (lack of) added value of this 
proposal. It also considers its relation to the Directive on advanced passenger information and 
PNR agreements between the EU and third countries, the lack of harmonisation and the 
consequences for the fundamental rights of individuals. 
 
The CEPS ‘Liberty and Security in Europe’ publication series offers the views and critical 
reflections of CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions 
surrounding the construction of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series 
encompasses policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and commentary 
about the internal and external implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies inside 
Europe and elsewhere throughout the world. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a 
personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is associated. This publication 
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form for non-profit purposes only and on the 
condition that the source is fully acknowledged. 
 
   
Contents 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
2.  Purpose and necessity of the PNR proposal........................................................................... 2 
3.  Relation to the Directive on advanced passenger information............................................... 3 
4.  Lack of harmonisation ........................................................................................................... 4 
4.1  Time limits .................................................................................................................. 4 
4.2  International or internal flights, or both?  ..................................................................... 5 
4.3  The functioning of the PIUs ........................................................................................ 5 
4.4  Authorities entitled to request or receive PNR data .................................................... 5 
4.5  Transfer of PNR data to third countries ...................................................................... 6 
5.  PNR, profiling and the fundamental rights of individuals ..................................................... 7 
5.1  Profiling and the right to non-discrimination .............................................................. 8 
5.2  The right to privacy ................................................................................................... 10 
5.3  The right to data protection ....................................................................................... 11 
5.4  Freedom of movement of EU citizens, their family members  
and third-country nationals under EU law ................................................................ 12 
6.  Negotiations on PNR agreements with third countries ........................................................ 13 
7.  Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 13 
References ................................................................................................................................... 16 
Appendix. Extract from Recommendation CM/REC(2010)13 of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, 23 November 2010 – Paragraph 4.1 ................................ 17 
 
  
| 1 
Ignoring Dissent and Legality 
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* 
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1. Introduction 
In February 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a new Directive on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.
1 This proposal follows and replaces an 
earlier draft of 2007 for a Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement 
purposes.
2 The draft Framework Decision, the primary goal of which was the fight against 
terrorism and organised crime, was critically received by the European Parliament, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, the 
Article 29 Working Party and other organisations. In their comments, these organisations 
criticised in particular the lack of evidence on the necessity and proportionality of the proposed 
measure, the insufficient level of data protection, and the risks of profiling and transfer of data 
to third countries. With regard to the new proposal by the Commission, the EDPS, the Article 
29 Working Party and the European Economic and Social Committee repeated many of their 
earlier criticisms.
3 
The new proposal does not seem to allay the earlier concerns with regard to the 2007 proposal. 
Its content contradicts important principles of data protection as described by the Commission 
in November 2010 in the Communication on a comprehensive approach to personal data 
protection in the European Union.
4 Furthermore, the proposal does not meet the general 
principle of proportionality, which is the basis of EU law.  
  
                                                      
* Evelien Brouwer is Associate Professor, Utrecht University. This paper is based on an earlier 
commentary on the PNR proposal written by the author on behalf of the Meijers Committee. The author 
would like to express her gratitude to Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera for their comments. 
1 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, COM(2011) 32, Brussels, 2 February 2011. 
2 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, COM(2007) 654, Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
3 See EDPS, Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, adopted on 25 March 2011; Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Opinion 10/2011, adopted on 5 April 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/ 
wpdocs/2011/wp181_en.pdf); European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, SOC/414, Passenger 
Name Record data/terrorist offences, 5 May 2011; and Committee of the Regions, Opinion, Council 
Document No. 10169/11, 13 May 2011. 
4 See European Commission, Communication on a comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union, COM(2010) 609 final, Brussels, 4 November 2010. 2 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
This paper addresses the following subjects: 
•  the extended purpose and (lack of) added value of this proposal, 
•  its relation to the Directive on the use of advanced passenger information (2004/82/EC), 
•  lack of harmonisation,  
•  consequences for fundamental rights of individuals, and 
•  its relation to the PNR agreements between the EU and third states. 
2.  Purpose and necessity of the PNR proposal  
Comparing the current proposal with the earlier draft of 2007, the Commission took into 
account some criticisms of the aforementioned stakeholders. With respect to the data retention 
periods, the original time limit of 13 years has been reduced to 5 years. Furthermore, in 
response to the criticism of the European Parliament and EDPS on the differentiation between 
the pull and push methods in the 2007 proposal (applying the push method to EU carriers, and a 
combination of push and pull for third-country carriers) the Commission proposal now provides 
for an exclusive use of the push method.
5 Still, despite these improvements, the new proposal 
does not really narrow the scope of its application, nor does it provide extra safeguards. On the 
contrary, instead of limiting the goals for which member states may use PNR data, the current 
proposal extends the purpose of this instrument further. Whereas the earlier draft Framework 
Decision on the use of PNR data was limited to the purpose of “preventing and combating 
terrorist offences and organised crime”, this has been changed in the new PNR proposal to “the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime”. 
Especially in the definitions of “prevention, detection and investigation” and “serious crimes” 
the national authorities are left with a wide margin of discretion, which will result in large 
differences among the member states implementing this Directive.  
For the definition of serious crime and serious transnational crime, the proposal refers to the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (2002/584/JHA), which could be 
considered a positive delimitation of crimes for which PNR data may be processed. Yet the list 
of offences in Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision still includes the possibility for divergent 
practices in the member states, including on interpreting general definitions of such terms as 
“terrorism”, “participation in a criminal organisation”, “corruption”, “computer-related crime” 
“facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence” or “sabotage”. According to the explanatory 
memorandum, member states may also exclude minor offences if their inclusion would not be 
proportionate, which implies that in general PNR data may be processed for minor offences as 
well. This possibility of exemption will likewise result in divergent implementation of this 
Directive by the member states. Finally, consideration 28 of the preamble provides that the 
possibility remains for member states to oblige air carriers to transfer PNR data for purposes 
other than those specified in the Directive. 
The reasons for the (extended) use of PNR data are not clarified. In the explanatory 
memorandum, the Commission refers to trafficking in human beings and drug-related crime, 
and illustrates the human and economic costs of these crimes using rather random data from 
various sources, including data of the UK Home Office on costs incurred “in anticipation of 
crime” of 2003. Moreover, the Commission does not provide real evidence of the added value 
                                                      
5 The ‘push method’ refers to carriers forwarding, by their own means, the PNR data to the national 
authorities of the arrival or departure state, whereas the ‘pull method’ implies that the national authorities 
obtain the PNR data by having direct access to the reservation systems of the air carriers. See also the 
Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on the PNR Proposal of 14 June 
2011 (http://www.fra.europa.eu). IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 3 
 
of using PNR data for the prevention or prosecution of these crimes. The European Commission 
only refers to examples in three countries (Belgium, Sweden and the UK) in which a substantial 
number of drug seizures would have been “exclusively or predominantly” due to the processing 
of PNR data. These data are not further specified, and surprisingly not mentioned at all in the 
impact assessment of this proposal. It also seems odd that according to the Commission, 
Belgium reported that 95% of all drug seizures in 2009 exclusively or predominantly stemmed 
from the processing of PNR data, while according to the same impact assessment Belgium 
would not have implemented any PNR scheme by that time. 
3.  Relation to the Directive on advanced passenger information  
The Commission does not provide information on the implementation of the Directive on the 
use of advanced passenger information (API), which was adopted in 2004 and for which the 
implementation date was exceeded in September 2006.
6 This Directive concerns the obligation 
of air carriers to transfer API to border officials for immigration law purposes. Considering the 
added value for law enforcement and migration control purposes, it is important to differentiate 
between API and PNR data. Whereas API concerns data from the machine-readable zone of the 
passport – including name, date of birth, passport number and nationality – PNR data includes 
data that are registered by the airline companies or travel agencies when a traveller makes a 
reservation: including the person’s name, seat number, travelling route, booking agent, credit 
card number, etc. These PNR data are collected for reservation purposes, and thus may differ 
for each air carrier organisation or may not always include the same categories of information. 
The most important difference between API and PNR is that the information that can be 
extracted from PNR data mainly depends on the data the passenger submits him- or herself to 
the ticket reservation system. Related to passport information, API data offer national officers 
more objective and permanently valid information, permitting the identification of individuals. 
Whereas PNR data (entailing diverse information on the passenger such as meal requests, 
contact information and travel agencies) may be useful for profiling, such data are less reliable, 
being dependent on what the traveller submitted him- or herself when making a reservation. In 
addition, as has been pointed out by the Association of European Airlines, with respect to the 
identification of passengers the PNR data are not always consistent with the persons actually on 
board the air carrier. Therefore, the inclusion of category (10) in the annex to the current 
proposal, concerning the PNR data to be collected, is rather pointless. Referring to the “travel 
status of passenger, including confirmations, check-in status, no show or go show information”, 
this includes data that are by definition not included in the PNR data, because this information 
will only be available when the passenger has (or not) checked in for his or her flight.  
During negotiations on earlier drafts of the API Directive, the use of API was originally planned 
for immigration control purposes alone. Shortly before the final adoption of the Directive, 
however, a provision was added according to which member states may use the passenger data 
for law enforcement purposes (Art. 6). One would have expected an evaluation by the 
Commission of the current use of the API Directive, together with the existing large-scale 
databases in the EU, before proposing new measures of data collection. Although Directive 
2004/82/EC does not include a sunset clause or obligation for the Commission to evaluate this 
instrument itself, it is in line with the general policy of the Commission to assess “the 
initiative’s expected impact on individuals’ right to privacy and personal data protection and set 
out why such an impact is necessary and why the proposed solution is proportionate to the 
                                                      
6 Council of the European Union, Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 August 2004 on the obligation of carriers 
to communicate passenger data, OJ L 261/24, 6.8.2004. In June 2010, the Commission started an 
infraction procedure against Poland for failure to adopt the necessary laws implementing the Directive, 
Case C-304/10, OJ C 246/22, 11.9.2010. 4 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
legitimate aim of maintaining internal security within the European Union, preventing crime or 
managing migration”.
7 This failure to first identify the security gaps of existing systems and 
methods of cooperation has similarly been pointed out by the Article 29 Working Party in its 
opinion of April 2011.
8 According to the Working Party, if any gaps exist, then the next step 
should be to analyse the best way to fill these gaps by exploiting and improving the present 
mechanisms, without necessarily introducing a whole new system. 
4.  Lack of harmonisation  
According to the European Commission, the PNR proposal would be necessary to harmonise 
national legislation on obligations for air carriers, preventing the creation of 27 “considerably 
diverging systems”, which could result in “uneven levels of data protection across the Union, 
security gaps, increased costs and legal uncertainty for carriers”. The goal of the current 
proposal is to guarantee “a uniform standard of protection of personal data under any proposal, 
and provide legal certainty for individuals, commercial operators and law enforcement 
authorities”.
9 
First, it seems justified to question the claim of the Commission that this proposal is necessary 
to prevent 27 diverging systems in the EU. At this time only three member states provide 
legislation for the use of PNR.
10 This means that rather than harmonising existing rules, this 
proposal will result in forcing a large majority of the EU member states to adopt a new law 
enforcement measure. Second, with regard to important issues on the collection and use of PNR, 
the current proposal does not provide for harmonisation at all. As mentioned above, the purpose 
of using PNR data has not been narrowly defined and the proposal leaves the member states a 
wide margin of interpretation by referring to “serious crime” and “serious transnational crime” 
and by including the aforementioned preamble 28. In the next sections, it will become clear that 
the proposal does not offer harmonised rules with regard to other important subjects either, 
including 
•  time limits, 
•  extension to internal flights, 
•  the functioning of PIUs, 
•  the authorities entitled to request or receive PNR data, and 
•  transfer of data to third countries. 
4.1 Time  limits 
Despite the shortening of the data retention periods from a maximum of 13 years to a maximum 
of 5 years, the 2011 proposal still includes some questionable provisions extending the use of 
PNR data. The proposed Art. 9 differentiates between a period of 30 days after the transfer of 
PNR data, in which they are retained in a database of the national Passenger Information Unit 
                                                      
7 European Commission, Communication on Overview of information management in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, COM(2010) 835, Brussels, 20 July 2010, p. 25. 
8 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2011, op. cit. 
9 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2011) 132, Brussels, 2 February 2011 – see pp. 15 and 20. 
10 These are the UK, France, and Denmark, with the remark that it is still unclear whether the UK will 
decide to opt in to this proposal. See the European Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Impact 
Assessment (SEC(2011) 132) of 2 February 2011, supra.  IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 5 
 
(PIU). After this period, the data will be stored for a further 5 years by the PIUs. In principle, 
during this period, all elements serving to identify persons will be ‘masked’, meaning that 30 
days after the transfer of their data, passengers can no longer be identified on the basis of these 
data. But during the period of 5 years access to full PNR data will remain possible for “a limited 
number of personnel of national PIUs” specifically authorised to carry out analysis of PNR data 
and to develop assessment criteria according to Art. 4(d) of the proposal. This latter provision 
allows the analysis of PNR data for the purpose of updating or creating new criteria for carrying 
out assessments in order to identify persons who may be involved in a terrorist offence or 
serious transnational crime. In other words, during these 5 years, personnel of PIUs may use 
non-anonymised data for the purpose of setting up new profiles. Meanwhile, during the same 
period of 5 years, each head of the national PIUs may have access to the full data “where it 
could be reasonably believed that it is necessary to carry out an investigation and in response to 
a specific and actual threat or risk or a specific investigation or prosecution”. The descriptions 
of both “limited number of personnel” and “specific investigation or prosecution” are too vague 
and allow disproportional use of passengers’ data.  
The proposed Directive allows the aforementioned time limits of 30 days and 5 years to be set 
aside by the member states. Art. 9(3) of the proposal includes an exception to the obligation to 
delete PNR data after 5 years, where they have been transferred to national competent 
authorities and are used “in the context of specific criminal investigations or prosecutions, in 
which case the retention of such data by the competent authority shall be regulated by the 
national law of the Member State”.   
Finally, Art. 9(4) allows the PIUs to keep the results of matching based on PNR data for an 
indefinite period, namely “as long as necessary to inform the competent authorities of a positive 
match”. An important provision is that which obliges the PIUs to keep data on so-called ‘false’ 
positive matches: these data should be kept for a maximum period of three years to avoid future 
false matches. Yet the proposal does not provide safeguards on the further retention of these 
data or on how other national authorities will be informed there has been a false match.  
4.2  International or internal flights, or both? 
On the basis of the proposed Art. 6, member states will have the choice between whether the 
obligation on air carriers applies only to international flights arriving in their territory or also to 
departing flights. Currently, the member states are negotiating the (optional) extension of this 
Directive to internal flights. This will mean that air carriers will have to deal with divergent 
rules applying in each member state. This will result not only in high costs for each air carrier 
organisation, but also in the different treatment of travellers within or coming to the EU. 
4.3  The functioning of the PIUs 
The draft Directive does not offer harmonised rules on the functioning of the national PIUs. The 
PNR proposal allows variations among the member states with regard to the assessments carried 
out on passenger data, the use and new creation of “pre-determined criteria” for the PNR 
assessments, and the further transfer of data to law enforcement authorities, other member states 
or third parties. As set out below, the use of profiling and the assessment of individual 
behaviour solely based on PNR data imply risks to the fundamental rights of travellers. The lack 
of harmonised criteria will increase these risks.  
4.4  Authorities entitled to request or receive PNR data 
Art. 5(1) of the proposal obliges member states to adopt a list of competent national authorities 
entitled to request or receive PNR data or the results of processed PNR data by the PIUs. The 6 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
Directive does not give any further specifications, however, other than that these authorities 
should be “competent for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime”. A comparable mechanism has been identified in the Data 
Retention Directive (2006/24/EC).
11 The list of authorities having access to telecommunications 
data, published in the European Commission’s recent evaluation report on the implementation 
of the Data Retention Directive, reveals many differences among the member states.
12 These 
differences concern in the first place the scope of ‘competent national authorities’. According to 
this evaluation, 14 member states include security and intelligence services, 6 member states list 
tax or customs authorities (or both) and 3 list border authorities. Second, the list makes clear 
many differences with regard to the procedure for gaining access to the telecommunication data. 
Among the member states, 11 require judicial authorisation for each request for access to 
retained data and 3 require judicial authorisation in “most cases”. In 4 member states the 
authorisation of a senior officer is required but that not of a judge, and in 2 member states the 
only condition is that the request is made in writing. In the evaluation report, the Commission 
states that it is necessary to assess the need for a greater degree of harmonisation with respect to 
the authorities having access and the procedure for obtaining access to retained data. In our 
opinion, the adoption of comparable mechanisms with regard to PNR data or other proposals 
granting national law enforcement authorities access to personal data (for example Eurodac) 
should wait for the outcome of such an evaluation.  
4.5  Transfer of PNR data to third countries 
Art. 8 of the 2011 proposal allows member states to transfer PNR data and the results of the 
processing of PNR data, only on a case-by-case basis and if 
•  it is in accordance with the conditions Art. 13 of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA;  
•  the transfer is necessary for the purposes of this Directive specified in Art. 1(2); and 
•  the third country agrees to transfer to third states only when necessary for the purpose of 
this Directive, and only with the express authorisation of the member state.  
The inclusion of the condition of “case-by-case basis” prohibits the systematic transfer to third 
countries; however, to ensure its effective application, this provision will need close 
supervision. Whereas the 2007 proposal only provided for the further transfer of PNR data, this 
draft also allows for the transfer of the results of the PNR analysis by the PIUs or national 
authorities. The reference to Art. 1(2) of the proposal excludes the transfer of PNR data for 
“other purposes” as mentioned in the preamble, but it does include the very wide definition of 
purposes as provided in Art. 4(2) of the Directive.  
Whereas the 2007 proposal explicitly stated that transmission to third countries may only take 
place in accordance with the national laws of the member state concerned and any applicable 
international standard, the 2011 proposal only refers to the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA.
13 This Framework Decision includes data protection rules in the field of police 
                                                      
11 See Art. 4 of Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105/54, 13.4.2006. 
12 European Commission, Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225, Brussels, 
18 April 2011 – see pp. 9-12. 
13 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008. IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 7 
 
and judicial cooperation. From the perspective of a uniform scheme of data protection law in the 
EU, it seems illogical to refer in this Directive on the transfer of passenger data to the rules of a 
former third-pillar instrument, when the Commission is expected to replace this instrument (and 
Directive 95/46/EC) with a new general instrument on EU data protection law in the near future. 
Furthermore, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA does not guarantee a harmonised approach by 
the EU member states. 
Art. 13 of the aforementioned Framework Decision allows the transfer to competent authorities 
in third countries or to international bodies if 
a)  it is necessary for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties;  
b)  the receiving authority in the third state or receiving international body is responsible for 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties;  
c)  the member state from which the data were obtained has given its consent to transfer in 
compliance with its national law; and  
d)  the third state or international body concerned ensures an adequate level of protection for 
the intended data processing. 
The Framework Decision allows transfer without prior consent in accordance with paragraph 
1(c) if the transfer of the data is essential for “the prevention of an immediate and serious threat 
to public security of a member state or a third State or to essential interests of a member state 
and the prior consent cannot be obtained in good time”.  
The adequacy of the level of protection referred to in paragraph 1(d) must be assessed “in the 
light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or a set of data transfer 
operations”. According to the Framework Decision, “particular consideration” must be given to  
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or 
operations, the State of origin and the State or international body of final destination of 
the data, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third State or 
international body in question and the professional rules and security measures which 
apply.  
This provision will also result in a differentiated approach by the member states. 
In addition, Art. 13(3) of the Framework Decision provides a very wide derogation from the 
aforementioned conditions and allows transfer of personal data if 
(a)  the national law of the member state transferring the data so provides because of 
i)  the legitimate specific interests of the data subject; or 
ii)  the legitimate prevailing interests, especially important public interests; or 
(b)  the third state or receiving international body provides safeguards that are deemed 
adequate by the member state concerned according to its national law. 
Finally, the draft Directive allows the further transfer of personal data from the third state to 
other third countries. Even if this requires the explicit consent of the member state concerned, it 
does not give other member states, national supervisory authorities, the EDPS or the 
Commission any power to control this further dissemination of passenger data.  
5.  PNR, profiling and the fundamental rights of individuals 8 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
According to the explanatory memorandum, the draft PNR Directive is aimed at achieving 
information on “unknown criminals or terrorists”. Unlike other databases, such as the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) or Visa Information System (VIS), which provide information solely 
on identified persons regardless of whether they are being reported for specific goals (arrest 
warrants or refusal of entry), the transfer and especially analysis of PNR data should assist 
national authorities of the member states in identifying criminal offenders or associates or 
persons suspected of terrorist or serious crimes. The Commission distinguishes among three 
possible ways PNR data can be used: “re-active”, “real-time” and “pro-active” use. “Re-active” 
use refers to use of the data in investigations, prosecutions and the unravelling of networks after 
a crime has been committed. With “real-time” use, the Commission refers to national authorities 
using data prior to the arrival or departure of passengers in order to prevent a crime, watch or 
arrest persons before a crime has been committed or because a crime has been or is being 
committed. In such cases PNR data may be used for running such data against predetermined 
assessment criteria to identify persons who were previously “unknown” to law enforcement 
authorities, or for running the data against various databases. Finally, “pro-active” use concerns 
the use of the data for analysis and the creation of (new) assessment criteria, which could then 
be used for a pre-arrival and pre-departure assessment of passengers. 
Dealing with both the 2007 proposal and the current draft of February 2011, stakeholders 
expressed their concerns about the impact of using PNR data for profiling on the fundamental 
rights of individuals. Profiling can be understood as an automatic data processing technique that 
consists of applying a ‘profile’ to an individual, particularly for taking decisions concerning her 
or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes.
14 
According to the Fundamental Rights Agency in its report on ethnic profiling of 2010, 
“profiling involves categorising individuals according to their characteristics, whether these are 
‘unchangeable’ (such as gender, age, ethnicity, height) or ‘changeable’ (such as habits, 
preferences and other elements of behaviour)”.
15 As discussed below, the rights at stake include 
the rights to privacy and data protection, non-discrimination rights, and the right to free 
movement. With regard to the latter right, it is important to distinguish between the right to 
freedom of movement as a human right protected in Art. 2 of the 4
th Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the one hand, and the freedom of movement as one of 
the fundamental rights of EU citizens and their family members, based on Art. 20 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Directive 2004/38/EC.  
5.1  Profiling and the right to non-discrimination  
Art. 14 ECHR and the12
th Protocol to the ECHR prohibit discrimination on any ground, such as 
gender, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
16 According to the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a difference in treatment is discriminatory, if 
it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” 
or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
                                                      
14 This definition is used in the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted on 23 November 2010, at the 1099
th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies. 
15 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Towards more effective policing: 
Understanding and preventing discriminatory ethnic profiling, a guide, FRA, Vienna, 2010, p. 8.  
16 The right to non-discrimination is further protected in the Convention on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Arts. 2 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Racial 
Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000). IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 9 
 
the aim sought to be realised”.
17 With regard to discrimination based on race, gender or 
nationality, very weighty reasons have to be submitted. In Timishev v. Russia, the ECtHR found 
that no difference in treatment based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic 
origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the 
principles of plurality and respect for different cultures.
18 In this case, concerning the refusal by 
Russian authorities to allow a national of Chechen ethnicity to pass administrative borders 
within Russia, the ECtHR found a violation of the right to non-discrimination with regard to the 
right to liberty of movement as protected in Art. 2 of the 4
th Protocol to the ECHR.  
Investigative or law-enforcing powers are often based on profiling, using generalised criteria 
such as nationality, country of origin, religion, etc.
19 Profiling on the basis of PNR data may 
expose passengers to risks of discrimination, resulting in a differential treatment that includes 
search or stop measures, or extra surveillance based on the aforementioned pre-selected 
criteria.
20 Such differentiation or discrimination should be limited to situations where an 
objective and reasonable justification exists, and when based on gender, race or ethnic origin, 
should only take place on the basis of very weighty reasons. A decision to stop and search an 
individual that is motivated solely or mainly by virtue of a person’s race, ethnicity or religion 
can be described as discriminatory ethnic profiling and is therefore unlawful.
21  
According to the Commission, the proposed use of PNR data has the advantage that it enables 
national authorities to perform “a closer screening only of persons who are most likely, based 
on objective assessment criteria and previous experience, to pose a threat to security”. This 
would facilitate the travel of all other passengers and reduce the risk of passengers being 
subjected “to screening on the basis of unlawful criteria such as nationality or skin colour which 
may wrongly be associated with security risks by law enforcement authorities, including 
customs and border guards”. The Commission addresses an important problem of current border 
controls and the risk that these controls are led by discriminatory considerations. It nonetheless 
seems questionable whether the aforementioned use of “pre-determined criteria” will actually 
result in less discrimination at the borders or whether it just changes the moment of screening 
by the PIUs. Both methods will have the same result, namely that a person may be refused entry 
                                                      
17 Refer to the case Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, Application no. 17371/90. 
18 See the case Timishev c. Russia, 13 December 2005, Application nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, paras. 
58-59. 
19 See the definition of the Open Society Justice Initiative on “ethnic profiling” in Ethnic Profiling in the 
European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective and Discriminatory, Open Society Foundations, New York, NY, 
May 2009: “the use by law enforcement of generalizations grounded in ethnicity, race, religion, or 
national origin – rather than objective evidence or individual behavior – as the basis for making law 
enforcement and/or investigative decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity”.  
20 See the aforementioned Recommendation of the Council of Europe (CM/Rec(2010)13), op. cit. See 
also Olivier de Schutter and Julie Ringelheim, “Ethnic Profiling: A Rising Challenge for European 
Human Rights Law”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2008, pp. 358-384; and András Pap, Ethnicity 
and Race-based Profiling in CounterTerrorism, Law Enforcement and Border Control, Study for the 
Directorate-General of Internal Policies of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, November 
2008; and Evelien Brouwer, The EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) System and Human Rights: 
Transferring Passenger Data or Passenger Freedom?,  CEPS Working Document No. 320, CEPS, 
Brussels, September 2009 (www.ceps.eu); and the Office of the High Commissioner of the United 
Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, OHCHR, Geneva, 29 January 
2007.  
21 FRA (2010), op. cit., p. 64. 10 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
or subjected to further investigation measures on the basis of “pre-determined criteria”, or in 
other words, the use of profiling.  
Art. 5(6) of the current proposal provides that competent authorities may not take any decision 
that produces an adverse legal effect on a person or significantly affects a person “on the basis 
of a person’s race or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical belief, political opinion, trade 
union membership, health or sexual life”. Although this general prohibition of discriminatory 
decision-making is to be welcomed, it does not exclude that the analysis or assessment of PNR 
data by the PIU may be based on one or more of the aforementioned criteria. This means that 
indirectly, on the grounds of this Directive, decision-making by competent authorities based on 
one of these discrimination grounds is still possible. Furthermore, the reference to “decisions” 
does not make clear that this prohibition also applies to the measures of national authorities, 
including physical measures such as searches or preventing persons from entering the territory. 
5.2  The right to privacy 
The systematic collection and storage of personal data by national authorities may fall within 
the scope of the right to privacy as protected in Art. 8 ECHR, irrespective of the use that is 
effectively being made or the sensitivity of the data.
22 In the case Marper v. United Kingdom, 
the ECtHR referred to the stigmatising effect of the long-term, systematic storage of fingerprints 
and DNA samples of individuals, including minors, who were suspected of having committed 
criminal offences, but not convicted.
23 In this judgment, the ECtHR found that the applicable 
UK law violated Art. 8 ECHR, particularly on the grounds that these data were stored for 
indefinite periods and concerned non-convicted persons, and was thus disproportional.
 
Considering both the stigmatising effect of being selected repeatedly on the basis of “pre-
determined criteria”, and the lack of sufficient safeguards and legal remedies for the individual 
in the current proposal, it is not unlikely that the systematic transfer and storage of PNR must be 
considered a disproportional infringement of the right to privacy. 
Of relevance with regard to the indiscriminate transfer and use of PNR data is the consideration 
of the ECtHR in the Marper case. More specifically, the Court states that it is struck by “the 
blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention in England and Wales” and the fact 
that “the material may be retained irrespective of the nature of gravity of the offence with which 
the individual was originally suspected or of the age of the suspected offender” (para. 119). The 
ECtHR concluded there was a violation of Art. 8 ECHR also because of limited possibilities for 
the individual to have the data removed from the nationwide database or to have the materials 
destroyed and because of the lack of independent review.
24 Moreover, as the ECtHR has pointed 
out repeatedly in its judgments, to fulfil the requirement that the breach of privacy is in 
accordance with the law, including the principle of foreseeability, the law must be sufficiently 
clear in its terms “to give individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
and the conditions on which the authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures”.
25 As 
                                                      
22 See ECtHR in the case Amann v. Switzerland, 16 February 2000, Application no. 27798/95 and Rotaru 
v. Romania, 4 May 2000, Application no. 28341/95. 
23 See the case S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, 4 December 2008, Application nos. 30562/04 and 
30566/04, para. 122. 
24 A report by the Dutch National Ombudsman of 2008 illustrates the devastating effects for a Dutch 
businessman, who as a result of identity theft and incorrect information in different files, including the 
Schengen Information System, was searched and arrested for more than ten years, at Schiphol airport 
among others. The main cause for this ongoing problem was the impossibility of obtaining the correction 
of his data in the different files at stake. See the report of 21 October 2008, 2008/132 (only in Dutch) 
(www.nationaleombudsman.nl).  
25 See the case Copland v. United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, 3 April 2007, para. 45. IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 11 
 
discussed above, the current proposal does not offer harmonised criteria and leaves the different 
member states wide discretionary powers with regard to the use, retention and further 
dissemination of passenger data. Therefore, the current proposal does not meet the criterion “in 
accordance with the law” of Art. 8(2) ECHR.  
Aside from Art. 8 ECHR, the right to privacy has been included in Art. 7 of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights. According to Art. 52 of the Charter, in so far as the Charter contains rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of these rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the ECHR, including the determination of these rights by the ECtHR in its case law.
26 
This means that when adopting new measures like the PNR proposal, the EU legislator is bound 
by the aforementioned interpretation of Art. 8 ECHR by the ECtHR. Taking into account Art. 6 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which aside from the provision on the accession of 
the EU to the ECHR, also confirms that the fundamental rights in the ECHR constitute the 
general principles of EU law, it is safe to assume that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) will follow the same approach of the ECtHR when it is requested to assess the 
lawfulness of the current proposal in the light of Art. 8 ECHR. 
5.3  The right to data protection  
Art. 8 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights safeguards the right of everyone to protection 
of personal data concerning him or her. According to Art. 8(2), such data must be processed 
“fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law”. Further safeguards are provided in Directive 95/46/EC on 
the protection of personal data.
27 In November 2010, the European Commission adopted a 
Communication on “a comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union”, including proposals and an approach for the review of the EU legal system on the 
protection of personal data.
28 In this Communication, the Commission defined general 
principles and guidelines for the future structure of EU data protection law. The content of the 
current PNR proposal is difficult to reconcile with these general principles. In the first place, the 
Commission advocates the further harmonisation of data protection law, which as we have seen, 
is not provided in the PNR proposal. Second, the Commission calls for enhancing control over 
one’s own data, for example by harmonising law on the individual’s right of access, correction 
and deletion of his or her data, and strengthening the principle of data minimisation. It also calls 
for clarifying the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ – the right of individuals to have their data no 
longer processed and deleted when the data are no longer needed for legitimate purposes.  
The PNR proposal does not incorporate an explicit right of access, correction or deletion of the 
individual. It only includes an obligation for member states to ensure that the private 
organisations involved (air carriers, agents or other ticket sellers) will inform passengers at the 
time of booking a flight and at the time of purchasing a ticket “in a clear and precise manner” 
about the provision of PNR data to the PIU, purposes of processing, period of data retention, 
possible further use and exchange of such data, and their data protection rights (Art. 11 of the 
proposal). For this purpose, one could refer to the right to information as formulated in 
                                                      
26 This provision does not prevent more extensive protection. 
27 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995. 
28 See European Commission, COM(2010) 609 final, op. cit. These principles have been further 
developed by EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding in her speech to the Privacy Platform, “The 
Review of the EU Data Protection Framework”, SPEECH/11/183, Brussels, 16 March 2011. 12 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
paragraph 4.1 of the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
(the text is presented in the Appendix to this paper).
29 
Another measure announced by the Commission in the aforementioned Communication is to 
make remedies and sanctions more effective. According to the Commission, the power to bring 
an action before the national courts,  to data protection authorities and to civil society 
associations, as well as to other associations representing data subjects’ interests, should be 
extended. The Commission also proposed to assess whether existing provisions on sanctions 
can be strengthened, for example by explicitly including criminal sanctions in cases of serious 
data protection violations, in order to make them more effective. It is a positive step that, unlike 
the 2007 proposal, the current PNR proposal includes a provision obliging member states to 
impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties” in case of infringements of the 
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive (Art. 11(7)). Yet these sanctions are not further 
specified and it is not clear against which authorities or organisations they may be imposed. Art. 
12 of the proposed Directive obliges member states to ensure that national supervisory 
authorities are responsible for “advising and monitoring” the application of this Directive, 
without supplying these organisations with binding or coercive powers. What is more, the 
proposal does not include any direct reference to individual data protection rights or legal 
remedies. 
5.4  Freedom of movement of EU citizens, their family members and 
third-country nationals under EU law 
Aside from non-discrimination, privacy and data protection rights, it should also be emphasised 
that the current proposal raises problems from the perspective of the fundamental freedoms of 
Union citizens and their family members as protected in Art. 20 TFEU and Directive 
2004/38/EC.
30 Art. 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC provides that every measure restricting the 
freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens and their family members must comply with 
the principle of proportionality and “be based on their personal conduct representing a genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”. 
Stop and search measures on EU citizens and their family members at the airport of a member 
state that are solely based on an analysis of PNR data of his or her flight cause an unlawful 
limitation of their freedom of movement. In the case Heinz Huber v. Germany, the CJEU made 
clear that the systematic and strict monitoring of EU citizens may infringe the right of non-
discrimination of EU citizens in relation to the proportionality principle to be observed on the 
basis of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
31 In this case, the CJEU found 
that the practice of the German central aliens administration of including data on EU citizens 
violated their right to non-discrimination on the basis of a strict application of the condition of 
necessity as laid down in Art. 7(e) of Directive 95/46/EC. Among others, the German legislator 
had failed to justify the necessity of the centralised nature of the database, the storage of 
individualised personal data in the AZR for statistical purposes, and the possible use of the 
personal data on EU citizens for law enforcement purposes.  
                                                      
29 See the Recommendation of the Council of Europe (CM/Rec(2010)13), op. cit.  
30 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004. 
31 See Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Germany, 16 December 2008. IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 13 
 
Furthermore, search measures grounded on PNR analysis on the basis of this Directive may also 
infringe the freedom of movement of EU citizens and third-country nationals, whose rights are 
guaranteed by EU legislation (for example the EU–Turkey Association Agreements, Directive 
2003/86/EC on family reunification and Directive 2003/108/EC on long-term resident third-
country nationals). Therefore, any measure on the large-scale collection and use of personal data 
should include a clause taking into account the freedom of movement and rights of EU citizens 
and third-country nationals. A comparable clause has been included in the Schengen Borders 
Code and the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC).
32  
6.  Negotiations on PNR agreements with third countries 
The discussion on the current PNR proposal cannot be considered separately from the 
negotiations underway between the Commission and third countries on the transfer of PNR data 
to these third countries. Here as well, one wonders whether the negotiators have learned from 
the past and taken into account the earlier comments with regard to the content of these 
agreements. Despite the intense and long-term discussions between the Commission, the 
European Parliament and other stakeholders on the level of protection in earlier agreements, the 
current texts of the PNR agreement with both the US and Australia still include many gaps with 
regard to the rights of passengers.
33 These gaps concern among others the long data retention 
periods, the wide discretion for US authorities to use the PNR data and the power to transfer 
these data to other third countries.
34 
When negotiating with third countries on the transfer of passenger data, whether with the US, 
Australia or South Korea, it is even more necessary to take into account the above comments on 
the protection of fundamental rights. Because these agreements concern the transfer of personal 
data to third countries – outside the legal order of the EU – the European Commission, data 
protection authorities or passengers will have few or no powers to control the lawfulness or 
security of the storage and further use of these data. As underlined by the European Parliament 
in its Resolution of May 2010, legal certainty for both EU passengers as well as airlines require 
a coherent approach and harmonised standards.
35 The standards applying to the transfer of data 
to third countries should not be below the level of the EU’s PNR system.   
7. Conclusion   
Considering the risks of violation of the fundamental rights of passengers, including EU citizens 
and third-country nationals, and the expected high costs for individual member states and air 
                                                      
32 See for example, Art. 3 of the Schengen Borders Code: “This Regulation shall apply to any person 
crossing the internal or external borders of Member States, without prejudice to: (a) the rights of persons 
enjoying the Community right of free movement; (b) the rights of refugees and persons requesting 
international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement.” See also Art. 4(2) of the Returns 
Directive (2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 
348/98, 24.12.2008): “This Directive shall be without prejudice to any provision which may be more 
favourable for the third-country national, laid down in the Community acquis relating to immigration and 
asylum.” 
33 Elspeth Guild and Evelien Brouwer, The Political Life of Data: The ECJ Decision on the PNR 
Agreement between the EU and the US, CEPS Policy Brief No. 109, CEPS, Brussels, July 2006. 
34 The most recent version of the EU–US PNR agreement includes a data retention period of 15 years, 
and the Agreement with Australia includes a retention period of 5.5 years. The texts are available on the 
Statewatch website (www.statewatch.org). 
35 European Parliament Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada, P7_TA(2010)0144. 14 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
transport organisations, the proposed PNR Directive should not be adopted. The Commission 
has not provided real evidence of the added value of the current PNR proposal for the 
prevention or prosecution of terrorist offences or serious crimes. Without further information on 
the added value of the dissemination of passenger data of every traveller flying from and to the 
27 member states, one must conclude that this proposal does not meet the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. This principle of proportionality, as reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in a case dealing with the dissemination of personal information on the 
Internet, is one of the underlying principles of EU law. This principle “requires that measures 
implemented by acts of the European Union are appropriate for attaining the objective pursued 
and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it”.
36 Earlier criticisms of the European 
Parliament, the EDPS and other stakeholders with regard to the 2007 proposal for a Framework 
Decision on PNR have not or only partially been taken into account. The new proposal does not 
offer clear rules with regard to the powers of national authorities to use PNR data or to transfer 
these data to other countries, nor does it include sufficient safeguards to protect the fundamental 
rights of individuals. The proposal lacks in particular harmonised rules on the following 
subjects:  
•  purpose limitation,  
•  data retention,  
•  individual rights, 
•  powers of supervisory and judicial authorities, and  
•  transfer of data to third countries. 
Before adopting new measures, the European Commission should be invited to evaluate current 
measures on the collection of personal data for law enforcement and migration control purposes, 
including VIS, SIS, the Prüm Treaty and the API Directive. Only on the basis of this 
information is it possible to identify the ‘security gaps’ in the fight against terrorism or serious 
crime.  
Any new draft on the transfer of PNR data should include an extended impact assessment with 
reliable and up-to-date information on the efficiency, financial costs and consequences for the 
fundamental rights of individuals. Such a new impact assessment could be based on the recent 
Operational Guidance on taking into account Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact 
Assessments, published by the European Commission in May 2011.
37 
If the aforementioned requirements are met, any future proposal on the use of PNR data should 
entail precise criteria limiting the discretionary powers of national authorities, including PIUs, 
with respect to the collection and use of personal data. A new proposal should incorporate 
limitative rules on the grounds for which data may be collected, the authorities ‘competent’ to 
receive and use such data, time limits for data retention, and applicable safeguards and sanctions 
for misuse or incorrect use of data. For this purpose, the standards as included in the 
recommendation on the use of profiling in the public and private sectors adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in November 2010 could be taken into 
account.
38 These standards, for example, concern the rights and legal remedies of individuals 
                                                      
36 See Case C-92/09, Volker and Markus Schecke v. Land Hessen and Case C-93/09, Eifert v. Land 
Hessen, 9 November 2010, para. 74. See also Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-0000, 
paras. 51 and 86. 
37 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 567 final, Brussels, 6 May 2011. 
38 Recommendation of the Council of Europe (CM/Rec(2010)13), op. cit. IGNORING DISSENT AND LEGALITY | 15 
 
pertaining to the collection and use of their data, which should be formulated more precisely, 
including the rights to information and financial redress.
39  
Considering the risks to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the conclusion of 
agreements with third countries on the systematic transfer of passenger data to third countries 
should be submitted to the same if not even more strict scrutiny as described above. If the 
individual rights of EU and non-EU passengers are not taken seriously now, it will only be a 
matter of time before the instruments at stake are denounced in either Strasbourg or 
Luxembourg.  
                                                      
39 With regard to the right to information, a provision has been included in the Recommendation of the 
Council of Europe on profiling – see the Appendix of this paper. 16 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
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Appendix.  Extract from Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
23 November 2010 – Paragraph 4.1 
 
Where personal data are collected in the context of profiling, the controller should 
provide the data subjects with the following information:   
a.  that their data will be used in the context of profiling; 
b.  the purposes for which the profiling is carried out; 
c.  the categories of personal data used; 
d.  the identity of the controller and, if necessary, her or his representative; 
e.  the existence of appropriate safeguards; 
f.  all information that is necessary for guaranteeing the fairness of recourse to 
profiling, such as  
-  the categories of persons or bodies to whom or to which the personal data 
may be communicated, and the purposes for doing so; 
-  the possibility, where appropriate, for the data subjects to refuse or 
withdraw consent and the consequences of withdrawal; 
-  the conditions of exercise of the right of access, objection or correction, 
as well as the right to bring a complaint before the competent authorities; 
-  the persons from whom or bodies from which the personal data are or will 
be collected; 
-  the compulsory or optional nature of the reply to the questions used for 
personal data collection and the consequences for the data subjects of not 
replying; 
-  the duration of storage; 
-  the envisaged effects of the attribution of the profile to the data subject. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
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